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A	question	of	trust:	Intra-party	delegation	in	the
European	Parliament
Much	of	the	European	Parliament’s	work	rests	on	negotiations	within
parliamentary	committees,	as	well	as	other	informal	negotiations	that	take
place	behind	closed	doors.	But	what	determines	the	selection	of	the	MEPs
who	participate	in	these	negotiations?	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Fang-Yi
Chiou,	Bjørn	Høyland	and	Silje	Synnøve	Lyder	Hermansen	illustrate	that
loyalty	to	the	leadership	of	the	transnational	parties	present	in	Parliament	is
the	key	factor	in	the	selection	process.	While	knowledge	about	a	given	policy	area	is	important,	parties	typically
develop	a	group	of	experts	from	which	they	can	select	candidates	rather	than	relying	on	individuals	with	the	most
expertise.
The	European	Parliament	provides	the	only	directly	elected	representation	of	EU	citizens.	It	is	also	–	on	many
accounts	–	the	least	powerful	of	the	EU	institutions.	Yet	Parliament	has	proven	to	be	impressive	in	imposing	its
influence.	One	reason	is	its	ability	to	coordinate.	Inter-institutional	decision	making	requires	negotiating	a
consensus	among	competing	interests	within	the	assembly	and	then	presenting	a	united	front	before	the	Council.
Individual	legislators	play	a	central	role	in	this	venture.	But	how	are	they	selected?	And	what	implications	are	there
for	their	selectors?
In	a	recent	study,	we	argue	that	the	transnational	party	leadership	delegates	tasks	to	loyal	members	and	builds	a
pool	of	alternative	experts	within	different	policy	areas.	For	individual	parliamentarians,	this	means	that	increasing
their	party	loyalty	always	pays	off,	while	specialisation	is	useful	–	although	boundedly	so.	For	the	party	group	as	a
whole,	it	means	that	members	can	trust	each	other	enough	to	divide	their	labour.
Parliament’s	policy-making	capacity	derives	from	its	committee	system.	Most	legislative	proposals	are	prepared	in	a
committee	before	they	reach	the	plenary.	This	enables	in-depth	discussions	to	take	place	that	would	be	impossible
in	a	mediatised	751-member	plenary.	There	are	several	advantages	to	this	arrangement.
Parliament	has	less	administrative	support	than	the	Commission.	For	most	of	its	history,	it	has	not	enjoyed
assistance	from	a	full-fledged	research	service.	Proposals	may	also	have	redistributive	effects	that	the	service
might	not	pick	up	on.	Parliamentarians	are	therefore	better	off	delegating	policymaking	to	specialised	colleagues
that	they	trust.	This	allows	them	to	shape	more	and	better	policies	in	line	with	the	promises	they	have	made	to
voters.	However,	forming	an	opinion	is	only	one	part	of	this	work.
Once	members	have	collected	information	and	assessed	a	proposal	from	the	Commission,	they	must	build	support
for	their	desired	amendments.	This	means	acquiring	support	from	a	majority	in	Parliament.	That	majority	must
include	at	least	one	of	the	two	major	party	groups	(the	European	People’s	Party	or	the	Progressive	Alliance	of
Socialists	and	Democrats).	Often,	it	also	has	to	be	oversized.	As	a	junior	partner	to	the	Council,	Parliament	must
signal	political	resolve	to	be	successful.	In	recent	years,	the	proportion	of	Eurosceptic	members	that	are	unlikely	to
support	any	European-level	policies	further	implies	that	mainstream	parties	must	come	together	across	political
divides.
Transnational	party	groups	bargain	over	the	responsibility	to	prepare	legislation	on	behalf	of	the	committee.	The
winner	then	appoints	a	“rapporteur”	to	incorporate	suggested	amendments	in	a	report.	“Shadow	rapporteurs”	from
the	other	groups	flank	this	person.	Together,	they	negotiate	a	consensus	in	a	series	of	“shadows	meetings”.	Later,
they	also	monitor	whether	the	rapporteur	follows	up	in	relations	with	other	legislative	bodies.	All	participants	also
report	back	to	the	committee	and	their	respective	party	groups.
The	European	Parliament	is	most	successful	when	negotiations	take	place	behind	closed	doors.	This	requires
members	to	rally	behind	the	party	label	when	early	agreements	are	reached	with	the	Council.	The	informal	nature
of	political	bargaining	puts	extra	strain	on	the	trust	between	colleagues.	Much	responsibility	rests	on	the	rapporteur.
When	legislation	is	technical,	the	rapporteur	will	coordinate	with	other	experts	to	find	a	common	solution.	When
issues	are	polarised,	the	rapporteur	also	has	a	special	duty	to	be	constructive	and	consensual.	The	rapporteur’s
network	is	essential	to	these	responsibilities.
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Party	groups	have	few	means	of	monitoring	the	rapporteur’s	actions	given	the	lack	of	transparency	and	the
consensual	nature	of	the	output.	The	leadership	therefore	has	to	trust	that	the	rapporteur	will	also	tow	the	party	line
in	the	shadows.	How	can	they	ensure	party	discipline	in	such	a	context?	We	argue	that	party	cohesion	flows	not	so
much	from	disciplining	tools	as	from	selection.	We	find	that	leaders	have	always	selected	rapporteurs	whose	voting
record	already	testifies	to	their	loyalty.
Figure	1:	The	effect	of	party	loyalty	on	report	allocation	in	seven	legislative	terms	(1979-2014)
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study	in	European	Union	Politics
The	technical	nature	of	policies	also	leads	the	leadership	to	prefer	members	who	have	specialised	knowledge
about	a	policy	area.	However,	beyond	a	certain	level	of	expertise,	the	rapporteur	may	be	able	to	trick	the	party	into
backing	amendments	it	would	not	otherwise	have	supported.	As	the	distance	between	group	members’	expertise
grows,	the	leadership	therefore	increasingly	looks	beyond	their	foremost	expert	and	selects	alternative	legislators.
In	this	way,	the	group	can	build	up	a	set	of	alternative	experts	for	any	given	policy	domain.	In	doing	so,	the	group	is
also	better	placed	to	keep	tabs	on	their	chief	negotiator	during	the	legislative	process.	In	the	next	allocation,	the
group	also	has	a	wider	choice	of	alternative	experts	and	can	choose	the	most	loyal	member.
Figure	2:	The	bounded	utility	of	specialisation	(measured	in	years	of	committee	service)	on	the	delegation
of	legislative	tasks	for	members	of	the	European	Parliament
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Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study	in	European	Union	Politics
The	consequences	of	the	leadership’s	choice	are	far	from	trivial.	Policy-seeking	members	of	the	European
Parliament	must	comply	with	their	transnational	party’s	voting	instructions	to	access	power.	When	national	parties
value	policy-impact,	this	also	has	an	effect	on	members’	chances	of	reelection.	Further,	it	means	that	the	existence
of	transnational	party	groups	in	Parliament	can	be	justified	in	an	informational	framework	because	members	need
to	trust	each	other	to	divide	their	labour	and	influence	policies	on	behalf	of	their	voters.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	study	in	European	Union	Politics
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	CC-BY-4.0:	©	European	Union	2019	–	Source:	EP
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